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L’université de Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne n’entend donner aucune approbation, ni 
désapprobation aux opinions émises dans ce mémoire ; elles doivent être considérées comme 
propre à leur auteur   
Introduction 
Population ageing process has become the most important tendency in the world in recent 
decades. Increasing share of the elderly in total population, the increase in life expectancy and 
decline in fertility, resulting in the reduction of labor force and increase in public finance 
beneficiaries, represents a real challenge for the economic performance, financial stability of 
social and pension systems of different countries in the world.  
Political attention to the problems of the population ageing was given in the 1980-1990s. 
Number of the studies was devoted to analysis of the consequences of an ageing process to the 
economy, financial systems and labor market. There was also a necessity to evaluate the 
responsiveness of the pensioners to different policy measures aiming at the change of 
pensioner’s behavior in a way that less detrimental to society, economy and financial stability of 
the pension system. That’s why better understanding of retirement behavior, its determinants was 
helpful in meeting these policy challenges. Thus researches have started to be interested in the 
study of older workers labor supply and their retirement decision.  
Retirement is important decision in life-cycle labor supply. There are a number of 
theoretical models of individual’s retirement decision which vary from simple one-period 
work/leisure choice model to sophisticated dynamic optimization problem. Most studies focused 
primarily on ex-post analysis of the observed retirement behavior using a work-leisure model or 
a life cycle labor supply model. Typically, actual retirement decisions have been treated as 
dependent variable and various social, economic and others factors have been shown to play an 
important role in this decision. So the empirical literature shed light on the retirement behavior 
of the elderly as well as on its possible changes due to different public policy measures.  
Russia is a country that faces also the consequences of the process of global ageing. 
Meanwhile, it current pension system characterizes already by inefficiency. It implies bigger part 
of federal budget financing (as a share of GDP) and higher rate of pension contributions than 
OECD countries whereas it affords lower replacement rate than in countries OECD members. 
More than that, long-term sustainability of Russian pension system is further jeopardized by the 
process of ageing of the population.  
In this study it’s showed that the only way to deal with the problem of population ageing 
and threat of financial sustainability of Russian pension system is increase in retirement age. 
However, this measure does not have political approval and is very unpopular among Russian 
population. So the Russian government should be really careful in its realization and envisage its 
possible influence on the retirement behavior of individuals and try to mitigate them. Thus, it is 
worthwhile to analyze the retirement behavior of individuals and to find out which factors are 
related to retirement decision and to see which types of workers would be impacted most by 
increase in retirement age. Understanding these factors will help to create conditions of easier 
adaptation for population to necessary retirement age increase. 
This paper presents the results of econometric analysis of retirement behavior of Russian 
pensioners. The aim of the investigation is determination of those factors that affect the 
retirement decision of men and women in Russia. Their understanding can be helpful for pension 
reform realization. This analysis is performed on the basis of data from the Russian Longitudinal 
Monitoring Survey. The data are taken from the 15
th
 to 19
th 
waves of survey that correspond to 
2005-2010 period of time. 
First of all this paper gives a survey of retirement literature, then describes the pension 
system in the Russian federation and particularities of retirement behaviour of Russian 
pensioners, after that it presents basic hypothesis of the analysis and, finally, concludes with 
econometric results and their interpretation.  
 
 
  
Chapter 1. Retirement behavior literature: its development and 
overview. 
The process of population ageing is a tendency of increase in the share of elderly 
population in the total population structure. It is a by-product of the demographic transition from 
high levels of mortality and fertility to the lower ones. It is occurring all over the world, but is 
mostly advanced in developed countries. 
1.1 The process of population ageing. Its causes, tendencies and implications for the 
economy and society. 
Due to decline in mortality rates and medicine progress, the world’s population is living 
longer now. Over the last five decades, life expectancy at birth increased globally by almost 20 
years, from 46.5 years in 1950-55 to 66 years in 2000-2005 and, according to the projections of 
UN, will continue to increase further in all parts of the world (see Figure 1).  
Figure 1 
Life expectancy at the birth: world and development regions 
 
Source: UN, World population ageing 1950-2050, p.6 
Another factor that generously contributes to ongoing demographic change is a decline in 
fertility rates (see Table 1). Actually, only this tendency on its own might be responsible for 
population ageing. That’s why unlikelihood of the fertility rate increase to the previous level, 
gives to the population ageing process irreversible character and long-term duration. 
Table 1 
Fertility rates  
  1960 1980 2000 2008 
East Asia  5,21 3 1,96 1,89 
Europe and Central Asia  2,75 2,16 1,55 1,7 
Latin America    5,97 4,2 2,65 2,23 
Middle East and North Africa   6,92 6,27 3,25 2,77 
North America 3,67 1,83 2 2,05 
South Africa 6,04 5,06 3,45 2,88 
Sub-Saharan Africa 6,67 6,7 5,59 5,13 
Source: The World Bank 
As a consequence, the older population grows at a considerable faster rate (2,6%) than that 
of the world’s total population (1,1%). In absolute terms, the number of older persons has tripled 
over the last 50 years and will more than triple again over the next 50 years (UN, World 
Population Ageing). So the number of countries facing to the population ageing process 
continues to grow further (see Figure 2) 
Figure 2 
Distribution of countries by phase in age transition* 
 
 *countries classified based on age group with greatest increase in population  
Source:   Lee R., Mason A., Cotlear D., 2010 
As a result population ageing leads to shift of the young-old balance throughout the world. 
In the more developed regions, the proportion of older persons already exceeds that of children, 
and by 2050 it is expected to be twice as much as that of children (UN, World population 
Ageing).  
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Extent and rapidity of the demographic change can be vividly traced in the population 
pyramid (see Figure 3). In 1990, world population essentially was a pyramid. In 2050, it will 
have the shape of a bell, and then, according to the UN, stabilize to 2100. 
Figure 3 
World population pyramid 
 
Source: Axel Borsch-Supan, 2004 
Thus the median age of population rose from 23.9 years in 1950 to 26.8 years in 2000 and 
is forecasted to rise to 37,8 in 2050. In developed countries the situation is even worse. The 
corresponding figures for them are 29 years for 1950, 37.3 years for 2000 and 45,5 years for 
2050 (David N. Weil, 2006).  
Increases in life expectancy have not, however, resulted in increase in the average number 
of years people spend in the workforce. The world’s population is retiring earlier now. Historic 
US data gathered by Ransom and Sutch (1986) indicates that around 60% of all men aged 65 and 
over were working in 1900. This ratio declined to 50% in 1950, fell below 40% in 1960 and 
continued to reduce in most European countries and the USA in further decades. Labor force 
participation rates of older Americans began to increase only in 2000
s
. According to the Bureau 
of labor statistics, labor force participation rate for those aged 65 to 69 increased from 24,5% to 
28,3% in 2000-2005 (Retirement decision report to congressional committees). As a 
consequence, current pensioners are spending up to a third of their lifetimes relying on public 
and private retirement benefits – the fact that is quite unfavorable for public finance and financial 
solvency of pension systems.   
All factors together significantly increases the elderly dependence ratio – the estimated 
number of people aged 65 and over in relation to the number of people aged 15-64 (see Table 2), 
and creates a situation where bigger number of potential beneficiaries of health and pension 
funds are supported by a relatively smaller number of potential contributors. These trends 
threaten the financial stability of national pays-as-you-go social security systems (World Bank, 
1994) and represent a major challenge for government in all countries around the world.  
Table 2 
Old-age dependency ratio: major areas, 2000 and 2050 
 
 Source: UN 
Threat to long-term financial stability of pension system is not only implication of 
population ageing process. Actually it affects a lot more aspects of individual’s life. In economic 
sphere it exerts an influence on: 
  economic growth.  
Taking into account the fact that pensioners have less savings and work less than people in 
working age, researchers concluded that population ageing would be accompanied with decline 
in labor resources, investments, and then in capital resources too, that will negatively affect 
economic development (Peterson, 1999; Lisenkova et al, 2008).  
However this finding is overstated because it doesn’t take into account change in behavior 
of individuals and politicians in response to this demographic change (Bloom et al, 2010). For 
example, government can change rules of migration to mitigate the scope of reduction in work 
force. Also, due to smaller number of children, each of them can receive better education, and it 
means, will have better quality of human capital etc. Such measures can moderate negative 
influence of population ageing on economic growth. That’s why the exact scope of influence 
depends on public policy and individual’s behavior in particular country.  
  Dynamic and volume of savings and investments.  
Here it is the type of pension system that matters. Usually, countries with funded pension 
system where pension savings of individuals accumulated during quite long period of time have 
bigger level of savings and investments than countries with Pay-As-You-Go system where 
pension contributions of current employers go to pension provision of current pensioners. That’s 
why in countries with funded pension system financial markets have more developed financial 
organization and bigger capitalization (see Table 3). 
Table 3 
Capital markets in countries with Pay-as-You-Go and Funded pension system 
  Pay-as-you-go systems Partially funded systems 
 Factor Year France Germany Italy Netherlands UK USA 
Stock market 
capitalization (% of 
GDP) 
1995 32,6 23,9 19,3 72,1 121,6 95,2 
1998 68,1 50,9 47,5 153,5 168,2 144,9 
2000 111,8 67,6 72,3 174,3 183,8 153,3 
Assets held by 
institutional investors 
(% of GDP) 
1995 77,7 45,3 32 154,5 164 151,9 
1998 107,3 66,1 79,6 193,2 203,6 192 
Assets held by pension 
funds (% of TA of 
institutional investors) 1998  - 5 5 58 37 37 
Assets held by pension 
funds (billion USD) 
1995 - 65,3 39 352,1 759,7 4259,5 
1998 - 69,5 37,4 323 1136,5 7161,6 
Pension fund 
investment (% of 
household wealth) 
1995 1,8 5,6 0,8 35,5 22,3 23,4 
2000 1,5 5,2 1,2 37,7 22,1 23,8 
 Source: Axel Borsch-Supan, 2004 
So countries with funded pension system will continue to observe the development of 
capital market, the rise of capitalization and corporate governance practice improvement. 
Countries with PAYG systems, facing with financial solvency problem of their pension systems, 
will be completed with funded component or characterized with increase in private savings (that 
will be complement to public pension size ensured by the system faced with substantial rise of 
old-dependency ratio). Thus savings for pension either public (managed by institutional investors 
and pension funds) or private will push the development of financial markets and give a rise to 
investments and productivity in economy.  
  Consumption structure.  
Change in consumption structure happens because needs and preferences of the elderly and 
of the youth are different. For example, according to German study (1983), the share of 
expenditures on transport, clothing and communication are reducing with age, while expenses on 
medicine and accommodation are increasing (see Figure 4).  
Figure 4 
Age-specific distribution of consumer spending across different group of goods 
 
Source: Axel Borsch-Supan, 2004  
So, global ageing will lead to shifts in consumption structure towards the bigger 
consumption of products that are necessary for the elderly. Moreover, changing product demand 
will precipitate shifts in sectoral labor demand and hence shifts in labor force structure.  
  labor market situation.  
Population ageing leads to increase in the share of the elderly and that’s why reduces the 
size of work force. Meanwhile, the major reason of demographic change is decline in fertility 
rate that from the labor force participation point of view gives to women a possibility to work 
those years that were previously devoted to child’s care. However, this source of work force rise 
is not so big, especially in developed countries, where fertility rate is already below 2.  
According to Robine J-M., Saito Y., Jagger C. (2009) life expectancy is increasing together 
with the increase in expectancy of healthy life duration (see Figure 5). This fact means that some 
part of the elderly that previously would like to work after achievement of retirement age can do 
it now because they don’t have health limitations. So, for example, data for USA showed the 
increase of the elderly participation rate in labor force during recent years. Thus total result in the 
change of labor force is indefinite and depends on the scope of these different tendencies in a 
given country.  
Figure 5 
Correlation between life expectancy at age 65 and number of years of healthy life in EU 
 Source: Robine J-M., Saito Y., Jagger C., 2009 
 Also labor market will be affected by change in consumption structure. As population 
ageing will lead to increase in the demand for medicine services and reduction in the demand for 
school/transport/clothes, significant part of the population will be forced to change their 
occupation. In the study of Axel Borsch-Supan (2004), such estimation for Germany will 
correspond to 7% increase in medicine employment, 5% decrease in transport employment. 
While altogether, 18% of employees will be forced to change their field of activity.  
  public policy 
Public policy changed, is changing and will be change to face the challenge of population 
ageing. This process involve not only the change in the structure of government expenditures but 
also a set of measures elaborating to mitigate the scope of adverse influence of the process of 
population ageing on different spheres of individual’s life.  
In social sphere population ageing reflects in 
  family composition. 
The elderly population is also ageing. The number of the individuals older than 80 is 
increasing with faster rate than elderly population that older than 60. It is increasing by 3,9% per 
year (UN). By 2050, two out of ten elderly individuals will be older than 80. This creates a 
necessity to care about these individuals because they need it more than anyone else. In the 
family context it impose new caregiving responsibilities on it members. Besides government 
should develop special institutions for those individuals who don’t have relatives that can take 
care of them. 
More than that, women predominate in elderly population because they have longer life 
expectancy (see Figure 6). That’s why the loneliness of women population in declining years is 
another social problem that can have some implication for society and require appropriate public 
support.   
Figure 6 
Percent share of women in world’s population in dependence of age. 
 
  Source: UN 
  migration tendencies.  
In some counties weakening of migration policy is a source of mitigate\ion of negative 
impact of population ageing on labor situation and economic performance. But the wave of the 
migrants might create social problems and have political implication that we don’t specify in this 
study.  
In political sphere the process of global ageing changes the electorate’s structure and its 
political activity and thus it affects election results. Some examples of this influence in case of 
Russia are given in the chapter 2.  
Nevertheless, the most direct and evident consequence of population ageing is impact of 
increase in old-age dependency ratio on financial solvency of pension system. To face this 
challenge most countries are forced to reorganize principles of pension provision in order to 
ensure its financial stability. Some of them are just changes in the rules of pension provision (for 
instance, increase in pension age), some of them – appropriate incentives for the elderly to 
change voluntarily their retirement behavior in a way that is beneficial for public finance. 
Anyway politicians need to create incentives that allow to mitigate the scope of the 
increase in the number of beneficiaries of the pension provision and the scope of decline in the 
number of contributors to it. That’s why better understanding of retirement behavior, its 
determinants is of help in meeting these policy challenges. Therefore researches have started to 
be interested in the study of older workers labor supply and their retirement decision.  
  
1.2 The models of retirement behavior. A review of theoretical literature. 
Retirement is important decision in life-cycle labor supply. However for it empirical 
analysis a theoretical framework that describes the economic principles behind individual labor 
supply choices is needed. There are a number of theoretical models of individual’s retirement 
decision which vary from simple one-period work/leisure choice model to sophisticated dynamic 
optimization problem. These models have proven to answer many of the research questions by 
incorporating the full choice process, the structure of retirement programmes, intertemporal 
preferences and uncertainties. 
 We begin with basic and simple model of an individual’s work decision which was the 
starting point for theoretical modeling and reference for nearly all early research before the late 
1970s. Then we trace the development of the modeling of retirement behavior during further 
decades. Generally, models are becoming more sophisticated due to incorporation of the 
previous research findings, characteristics of reality and availability of the data.  
The basic work-leisure choice model 
The most simple and fundamental model is a work/leisure choice model which deals with 
the decision of the individual to allocate total available time (T) between two competing uses, 
the amount of time devoted to work (H) and the amount of time devoted to the leisure (L). In this 
model the person’s level of satisfaction (level of utility) depends solely on the consumption of 
goods (X) and the amount of the leisure that he enjoys. If income can always be earned at a wage 
rate of w per hour worked (for example), then the total income available to the individual 
consists of total earning (wH) and any nonwage income (V). Thus the person’s attainable level 
of utility is limited by the budget constraint pX ≤ w(T-L) + V.  
Max U = U (X, L) 
 s.t.  pX ≤ w(T-L) + V. 
In this simple model the individual’s choice of how much time to work is determined not 
only by the budget constraint but also depends on the person’s taste and preferences for leisure 
and consumption (see Figure 7). The solution to the problem is given by the worker’s labor 
supply function H = H (p, w, V). In the first stage the person decides whether to work at all. At 
the second stage he determines how many hours to work. 
Figure 7 
Graphical representation of basic work/leisure choice model 
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This model implies that an increase in income in any period t results in less hours of works 
in that period (leisure is a normal good). And a change in the wage has two effects: the increased 
buying power implies that more leisure should be consumed, but an increase in the wage makes 
leisure relatively more expensive. The net effect is ambiguous.  
This model contains the essential features of the economic theory of work/leisure choice and 
serves as a basis for majority of labor supply research and more sophisticated model 
development.  
A simple lifetime retirement model. 
The easiest and most primitive retirement model is a straightforward application of the 
single-period work/leisure choice model described above. It treats each year in the individual’s 
lifetime independently and implies that retirement decision affects one year at a time (Lazear, 
1989). So the worker’s lifetime utility function can be written as: 
),,...,,,,( 2211 tt XLXLXLUU      
In order to convert it to the standard one-period work/leisure framework, it’s sufficient to 
write the utility function as:  
),(...),(),( 222111 ttt XLUXLUXLUU   
and ensure that no borrowing or lending occurs. This permits to treat each year in the 
individual’s lifetime completely separately. In other words, the analysis considered a one period 
optimization problem, in which the budget constraint and utility function include present 
consumption, income and leisure. By maximizing his one-period utility individual determines the 
number of hours devoted to work (Ht) in each period. Retirement occurs when an older person’s 
choice of the number of hours devoted to leisure equals the full amount of available time.   
Nearly all of the early retirement studies tried to explain labor participation trends for 
American male workers by this single period work-leisure model. Up to that point, retirement 
was regarded as involuntary and only since the late 1970s it started to be considered as voluntary 
decision of individual who compares the subjective value of the leisure and actual size of his 
labor compensation and take decision on the basis of this comparison. 
 Altogether, these studies tested whether the expansion of the social security programs 
during the post-World War II period might have prompted (due to the income effect) the decline 
in the labor-force participation among men aged 65 and over. They used retirement models in 
which the value of annual Social security benefit and private pensions enter as a key explanatory 
factor of the retirement decision.  
In one of the earliest studies Boskin (Boskin, 1977) found that the value of the current 
annual Social Security benefit had pronounced effect on the decision to retire. A 1000 $ increase 
in annual size of social security benefits was associated with an increase in the probability of 
retiring from 0,075 to 0,16. In general, the impact of health status, financial incentives, personal 
and job’s characteristics, local labor market conditions on labor-force participation decision was 
investigated within the context of this model (Quinn, 1977; Munell, 1974; Burtless and 
Hausman, 1980).  
However this model allowed to explain only part of retirement behavior with the influence 
of Social Security incentives, heath conditions and etc. Feldstein (1974) showed that current 
income levels cannot fully explain retirement patterns, future income opportunities appear to be 
important as well. Labor supply decisions may be based on preferences for future consumption 
and leisure, and determined by future income levels and retirement opportunities. If working an 
additional year leads to a substantional higher retirement benefits one year later, than postponing 
the retirement is attractive. But here nothing is said about the relations among tU  and 1tU . 
Burkhauser (1976) recognized that this simplification is misleading. In the data that he 
examined, he observed that the pension value associated with early retirement often exceed that 
for normal ages of retirement and this findings allowed to him to understand and explain the 
phenomenon of early retirement. More than that, in this model there is no specification for the 
possibility to return to the labor force in the subsequent periods.  
Since future opportunities and preferences may influence present retirement decision, the 
analysis should be states in a life-cycle context.  
Multi-period models 
The major problem with one-period model of retirement is the assumption of intertemporal 
separability which implies that wages at other periods of work life are irrelevant for the 
retirement decision. They also imply that only the current pension level affects the worker’s 
retirement decision. Thus taking into account the interdependence of the choices in the different 
time periods we can better model individual behavior. In models of this type individual should 
formulate a long-term plan for work and consumption that maximizes satisfaction over the 
expected lifetime. 
Attempt to develop labor supply model that fully incorporates life cycle idea was reflected 
in the simple reduced form model that included detailed information on life cycle income 
patterns. For example, Fields and Mitchell (1984) used a linear model to regress the retirement 
age on current and future streams of earnings, private pensions and social security benefits, 
where the structure of pension plans was explicitly incorporated. In choosing a retirement age, 
individuals weigh the monetary advantage to be gained by postponing retirement another year 
and the value of foregone retirement leisure. Individuals compare these values and choose their 
preferred age of retirement.  
An important feature of this model is the fact that it assumes that all changes in income 
streams, including Social Security are fully anticipated by workers. The idea that the time 
dependent composition of early retirement programs determines labor participation behavior led 
to more attention for structural models. Although many models were already structural in the 
sense that they captured multiple retirement opportunities and constraints, the retirement 
literature became more concerned with structural representation of labor supply.  
  Structural models 
Structural models can potentially incorporate much of the detail of individual’s lifecycle 
budget constraints. These models allow economists to measure the specific effects of numerous 
features of social security and pension plans rather than restricting their financial incentives to 
operate through one or two summary measures, such as monthly benefit amount or a coverage 
indicator.  
One of the best examples of this approach is the structural and empirical retirement model 
by Gustman and Steinmeier (1986) which is based on the optimization of life time utility 
determined by consumption and leisure. In this model preferences for income and leisure 
gradually shift in favor of leisure as individual age. An important feature of this model is the 
recognition that retirement sometimes occurs gradually via the transformation from full to part-
time work. Moreover the model allows preferences to vary both across individuals and over time 
with age, health and by cohort. The model allowed for the prediction of labor supply under 
policy changes that affect the full compensation profile. It has been one of the first models that 
was able to explain the U.S. retirement peaks at age 62 and 65. As in case of the Fields-Mitchell 
research, this model also assumes that all changes in income streams from various sources are 
foreseen.  
This type of models was a big step towards the structural analysis of retirement decision, but 
was not flexible enough for general applications.  
The major drawback of structural multi-period models is inability to include in the model 
uncertainty about real future values. Diamond and Hausman (1984) argued that unexpected 
events can seriously disrupt the retirement plans. In order to control for uncertainty about the 
health conditions and employment opportunities, they estimated a hazard model in which 
uncertainty is a part of the basic decision process. In the review of the literature Lazear (1986) 
recognized also the need for structural retirement models that would also include uncertainty 
about environment and the values of other explanatory factors. 
With the development of the study of older workers retirement models have become 
increasingly dynamic. 
Dynamic models 
Early models were usually static in the sense that labor-force status was determined by a set 
of causal factors. Individual accurately foreseen these factors and make lifetime work plans that 
are subsequently carried out without change. The possible changes of the causal factors over the 
time were not captured by these models.  Dynamic models allowed changes of explanatory 
factors over time. More particularly, the sequencing and timing of these changes is held to be 
critical to the behavior being investigated. So retirement was more and more considered as a 
dynamic process where plans change when new information concerning causal factors becomes 
available to individual.  
Starting with the work of Rust (1989), dynamic programming models met this challenge. 
Rust modeled the formation and revision of individual’s expectation. He derived the retirement 
behavior of older male worker as a solution to a stochastic dynamic programming problem. This 
model was computed numerically, applying “the nested fixed point” algorithm and 
supercomputer Cray-2.  
In Rust model the worker’s objective is to maximize expected discounted utility over his 
remaining lifetime. This maximization must be based on expectation about longevity, health, 
marital status, income and wealth – all determinants of retirement whose future values cannot be 
known with certainty when long-term plans are formulated. At the beginning of each year, the 
individual has 2 choices: retire now and derive utility from future retirement benefits, or work 
for one year and derive utility from income while working during this year and retaining the 
option to choose the best of retirement or work in the next period. By doing so, each future 
utility mast be discounted by the probability of realizing it (the probability of surviving to year τ 
given that the worker alive in year t). Thus, at each time period he chooses how much to 
consume and whether to work full-time, part-time, or exit the labor force. Thus the full model 
simultaneously explains his employment status, consumption expenditures and the timing of the 
first application for Social security benefits. The worker formulates his utility-maximising plan 
for work and consumption and routinely revises it as he ages and acquires additional 
information. 
The model accounts for the sequential nature of the retirement decision problem, and the 
role of expectations of uncertain future variables such as the worker's future lifespan, health 
status, marital and family status, employment status, as well as earnings from employment, 
assets, and social security retirement, disability and medicare payments. Moreover, this approach 
assumes substantial rationality on the part of individuals and a predilection for carrying out long-
term plans.  
 Dynamic models can potentially incorporate enormous amounts of details about 
individual and given the power of modern computers, are limited only by data availability and 
researcher’s ingenuity and diligence.  
 Option value analysis 
However, in order to avoid these computational complexities, Stock and Wise (1990) 
reduced their dynamic programming to option value models. This type of models focuses on the 
fact that at any point in time the decision to continue working maintains an option to retire at a 
future date that has a value that changes appreciably over time. At any point in time, the present 
value of all expected future pension payments can be calculated assuming that the worker retired 
immediately. Similar calculation can be made assuming retirement at other dates in the future, 
discounting future income streams to the same point in time. The “option value” of continued 
work is the difference between the highest present value associated with retirement at any future 
date and the present value of retiring in the current period. It’s advantageous to postpone the 
retirement as long as the option value is positive. The optimal retirement date occurs at that point 
where the option value first falls to zero or a negative value.  
Stock and Wise used an option value approach to model the retirement decision of 1,500 
persons employed by a large, Fortune 500 firm. The key simplifying assumption in the Stock-
Wise option value model is that the retirement decision is based on the maximum of the expected 
present values of future utilities if retirement occurs now versus each of the potential future ages. 
By contrast, in dynamic model the expected value of the maximum of current versus future 
options. The expected values of the maximum of a series of random variables will be greater 
than the maximum of the expected values, so Stock-Wise model can underestimate the value of 
postponing retirement relative to the dynamic model. Of course which model is more consistent 
with retirement behavior of individuals remains a separate question, but Stock-Wise model 
produced a good overall fit and predicted the retirement behavior of the sample very well.  
  
1.3 Determinants of retirement. A review of empirical literature.  
Overviewing analysis of retirement in different studies allows to distinguish explanatory 
factors that have received particular scrutiny in empirical literature. There are health status, 
pension scheme and social security programs. Of course there are a number of other factors that 
influence retirement decision, like individual’s or job characteristics, local labor market 
condition etc. In this paragraph we list nearly all of the factors together with the direction and 
explanation of their influence.  
Let’s start with the job’s characteristics.  
Job characteristics 
As was shown earlier, a net effect of the influence of wage size on retirement decision is 
ambiguous. Higher current wage produces an income effect, which tends to encourage earlier 
retirement, and a substitution effect, that makes the leisure costly and discourages early 
retirement. Thus the influence of wage size on retirement behavior depends on individual’s 
preferences for work/leisure. 
That’s why there is no unique result in empirical studies. For example, Hurd and Boskin 
(1981), Quinn (1977) find no effect of the current wage on retirement. However, Burhauser and 
Quinn (1980) find some deterrent effects of current wage on retirement.  
Education level 
Lazear point out that the shape of age-earnings profile is an important determinant too. 
Steeper profile is likely to discourage leisure taken early in life and to encourage later retirement 
than the flat one. Mincer (1974) explains this with differences in education level. He showed that 
the age-earnings profiles are parallel in logs as education changes. This implies that more 
educated individuals have steeper age-earnings profile in absolute levels. Steeper profile in its 
turn reward work in later years relative to work in earlier years.  
This evidence was found in the study of Burkhauser (1979). However he did not implicitly 
incorporate in the analysis individual’s education level. In the studies of Alicia H. et al, and A. 
Kalwij, F. Vermeulen level of individual’s education had been taken into account and was 
associated with the positive influence of the age of retirement.  
So, the individual’s level of education is an important determinant that affects the retirement 
behavior through the way of individual’s earnings growth during lifetime. 
Nature of job 
Another important factor is a nature of the job on which people find themselves prior o 
retirement. For example, early research concluded that people in physically demanding jobs 
retire earlier (Gustman and Steinmeier, 1986) 
Institutional rigidities 
Apart from the size of earnings and their growth throughout the lifetime, there are some 
workplace rigidities that might force older workers into retirement One of these factors is a 
mandatory retirement, which used to insure that workers upon reaching the retirement age leave 
the job. The essence of this practice is explained by Lazear (1979). In the deferred compensation 
scheme, when workers are unpaid when young and overpaid when old relative to their 
productivity, mandatory retirement is a only way to ensure that the worker’s total compensation 
doesn’t exceed his lifetime value to the firm because it requires that workers leave the job at 
some (previously agreed on) point. 
Also, this can be inflexibilities regarding hours or days of work, job pace and job stress, the 
need for acquisition of new skills on the job and perhaps, even employer attitudes toward older 
workers Nevertheless the perceived importance of these factors in retirement behavior, most of 
them have not been yet incorporated in economic analysis of retirement behavior. 
Marital status and existence of children. 
The individual’s family is another important determinant of the retirement decision. Firstly, 
the income of the spouse affects the wealth level of the household and that’s why the demand for 
leisure of both individuals. Because of the recognition this influence there were some attempts to 
incorporate this aspect of joint-decision in family context into models of retirement behavior. 
But due to data limitations empirical studies of such models of joint-decision in the family 
context don’t receive many attention/ 
Secondly, the value of leisure might depend on the presence of the spouse and that’s why 
widows and married individuals might have different retirement behavior. For example, the 
married elderly might prefer to retire earlier to spent more time with his/her partner, whereas 
widows in the age of retirement may prefer to work as long as possible to escape the feeling of 
loneliness without job and his/her partner. This evidence was found in the study of Alicia H. et al 
(2003).  
Thirdly, individuals with wealthy children may enjoy some transfers in old age and these 
transfers may affect retirement behavior, for example, due to income effect.  
Moreover, individuals with one or more children in elderly age may be involved in 
grandparents’ activities that claim much time and force them to leave a job. It’s especially true in 
Russia, where young parents, in order to continue their career path, prefer to leave their babies 
with grandmother /grandfather than hire nurse. And that’s why the elderly, especially women 
may be forced to retire as soon as possible.  
In the analysis of A. Kalwij, F. Vermeulen (2005) they found that the presence of many 
children affects differently the retirement behavior of women and men: it forces to retire women 
whereas encourage men to work more and postpone their retirement. The explanation for women 
have been already done before, they are occupied with caregiving activities with their 
grandchildren. As for men, everything depends on the age of children. The older they are the 
more they are financially independent and even can help their parents with money in order to 
give them a rest from work. But the younger they are the more efforts should be done by their 
parents to help then to enter the university and to study comfortably there without thinking where 
to get money for studies or for accommodation etc. And this fact requires the continuation of 
work and that’s why men have to postpone their retirement. Herewith the bigger the number of 
children in the family is the bigger the probability that there are some of them that are financially 
dependent exists. 
Altogether, it makes evident that the marital status, child presence and their number 
influence the retirement decision of the elderly. 
Health status 
Many studies apart from focusing on financial determinants of retirement have also 
examined individual’s characteristics and more particular, the influence of health on retirement 
(Boskin and Hurd (1981), Gustman and Steinmeier (1986) etc.). Most of these studies found that 
the poor health encouraged early retirement (Rust, 1989) 
As argued by R. Lumsdaine health has 2 central effects – on the budget constraint and on 
preferences. Focusing firstly on the budget constraint, most would acknowledge the detrimental 
effect of poor health on employee compensation profile. Ill employees are less productive in the 
short run, suffer more absenteeism in the medium run and be less likely to invest in longterm 
skills in the long run. That’s why poor health of older workers in comparison with the health 
status of young employees reduces older workers employability and detracts from their 
compensation offers. In response to this lower payment, older workers might be likely to leave 
their jobs, reduce hours and eventually retire.  
To the negative effect of illness on wages must be added the possibility that poor health can 
alter the value of peoples’ time or change one’s time horizon if the person has mortal disease. 
For example, ill person needing to devote several hours per day to heath treatments would 
simply have fewer hours per day in which to work.  
Also poor health can influence retirement by changing people perception of the utility of 
work versus leisure. This can happen because the worker’s job becomes more stressful or it 
might occur if the ill person values home time more when feeling unwell.  
So there are a number of ways in which health conditions can affect the retirement behavior 
and including health measures in the analysis of retirement is important thing to do. But 
measuring the individual’s health status appropriately is difficult task for researchers. There have 
been developed a variety of health measures, including self-evaluation of health status, reported 
weeks of illness and mortality experience. But there may be problems with some of them that 
should be taken into account while choosing the proxy for health evaluation in empirical 
analysis.  
Individual self-evaluation of health status reported in the period of the retirement behavior 
has been often criticized because individuals may be claiming poor health after they retire in 
order to justify reduced labor force participation (Bazzoli, 1985). Early retirees reported being in 
worse health than more objective measures would suggest. More than that, studies that have used 
this self-assessment of health have often found that health is more influential than financial 
consideration in explaining retirement – the fact that was argued in a later research.  
Attempts to fix this problem by using survey information related to health that don’t involve 
self-assessments are also not free from drawbacks. As pointed out by Bazzoli, such health 
measures as total hours of illness in a given year, are more objective in nature, but the 
relationship between such indicator and the presence of limiting health condition is not clear. 
Many illnesses are temporary and don’t have long-term impact on health status and don’t 
influence the person’s ability to work near the retirement age. 
Another approach elaborated by Burkhauser and Quinn (1981) consists in using self-
assessment of health status prior to retirement. Thus, this measure is unaffected by ex-post 
rationalizations of retirement and thus don’t produce bias in estimations.  
Pension payments 
A number of studies examine the effect of pension payments on retirement behavior. Boskin 
and Hurd (1978) found that the higher the size of eligible pension at the time of retirement, the 
more likely the individual retires. But this finding has been completed in later research because 
the institutional organization of pension provision have been changed in time in order to address 
the ageing population process and allowed to see others aspects in the retirement behavior in 
response on different impetus in pension provision. For example, Gustman et al (1994) received 
evidence that workers with generous pensions retire somewhat earlier than those with smaller 
pension. These differences are statistically significant but small. At the same time, employees 
received more money to delay retirement tend to do so. Here too, the estimates are statistically 
significant but small.  
However these estimations might be overstated, to the extent that firms design their pension 
plans to attract workers with tastes for retirement. Thus an early retirement benefit program 
might appear to be correlated with a high fraction of early retirees, but the correlation might not 
be a proof of causation. Therefore the researchers have turned to examine worker responses to 
unanticipated early retirement windows arguing that this type of data better represents worker 
response to exogeneously changing pension opportunities.  
Demand side in retirement models 
Most studies of retirement behavior have concentrated on the supply side of the market, 
leaving the demand for older workers neglected, as pointed out by Straka (1992). Older workers 
often complain that suitable opportunities are limited. Many older workers would prefer to 
continue working part-time for their employer rather than retire completely, but few employers 
appear to offer this option. Continued employment for the older worker usually entails a change 
in employer and may be in character of work. The constraints that govern the individual choices 
should be taken into account while studying the retirement behavior.  
 
 
  
Chapter 2. Case of the Russian Federation  
2.1 Population ageing in the Russian Federation 
Global tendency of population ageing is also typical for the Russian Federation.  In the 21
st
 
century older Russians are expected to make up a larger share of the Russian population, live 
longer and spend more years in retirement than previous generations. However, process of 
population ageing in Russia is characterized by more severe character (see Figure 8). It occurs 
faster due to small value of fertility rates that are below the replacement rate (fertility rate was 
1,54 in 2009
1
). 
Figure 8 
Population pyramids 
 
 Source. UN, 2001 
The share of Russian population aged 65 and older constituted 6,2% in 1950, increased to 
14% in 2000 and is projected to continue to grow till 22,3% in 2030 and 27,8% in 2050 (UN, 
2009). The same prospects are indicated by Russian experts (see Table 4).  
Table 4 
Total population by major age groups 
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 Federal State statistic service: http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b10_44/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d01/02-11.htm 
Source: Federal State statistics office  
Given that in Russian pension system there are some pension priveleges for retirement 
before legally settled age, as well as social pension provision for disabled young population, the 
dependancy of the pensioners on working age population is even bigger and has already 
achieved 562 pensioners to 1000 employees in 2008 (Maleva, Sinyavskaya, 2011).  
At the same time, there are some privileges for pension contributions payment, for example, 
for small entreprises that use reduced form of taxation, for entrepreneurs. We should also 
mention the existence of shadow economy. Estimations of the size of shadow economy in 162 
countries shows that in Russia it is bigger than in comparable countries and constitues a chare of 
41% of GDP. In Brazil it’s 37, in Turkey – 29, in India – 21, in Republic of South Africa – 25%. 
These tendencies indicates that actual dependent ratio is even more bigger because reduced form 
of taxation and, moreover, the employment in shadow economy reduces further the total amount 
of contributions to pension system. 
All these factors together threaten the financial stability and solvency of the Russia’s 
pension system. It means that keeping replacement rate of pensions at the current level will be 
impossible without significant change in the structure of pension provision.  
  
2.2. The Russia’s pension system.  
Basic principles of current Russian pension system were established in 2002. It based on 
mandatory retirement insurance, where employers who carry out activities on territory of the 
Russian federation should make compulsory retirement contributions for every employee they 
have. The sum of all contributions is a basis for pension provision for current and future 
pensioners due to composite structure of pension contributions (see table 5). 
Table 5 
The social contribution rate 
 The Pension Fund of the Russian Federation  Compulsory 
Medical 
Insurance Fund  
Social 
Insurance 
Fund Insured component Funded component 
For those born in 
1967 and later 
16 6 5,1 2,9 
For those born in 
1966 and earlier 
22 0 5,1 2,9 
For those born in 
1967 and later
2
 
10 - 0 0 
For those born in 
1966 and earlier
2 
10 - 0 0 
 Source: official site of Pension Fund of the Russian Federation.  
Insured component of social contributions is counted on special notion account and 
constitutes a basis for payment of insured part of individual’s pension in future. Every year they 
are indexed according to the average wage growth and Pension Fund of the Russian Federation 
(PFRF) revenue per pensioner growth, but not higher than the PRRF revenue per person 
increase. Actually this money goes to pay pensions for current pensioners.  
Funded component of social contributions is obligatory for working people born in 1967 and 
later and voluntary for others. More particularly, workers born in 1966 and earlier can participate 
in the State pension co-funding programme and determine the size of voluntary contributions. 
These contributions are included into special part of person’s notional account and operated by 
Management Company chosen by individual.  Person has a choice between: 
o State management company – Vneshekonombank. This company invest funded parts 
of social contributions only into state bonds, that are less risky and less profitable 
o Private management company, chosen by the bidding. These companies have bigger 
list of assets to which pension contributions can be invested.  
This is a mechanism of labor pension provision, the most common type of pension in 
Russia. According to the federal law “Labor pensions in the Russian Federation”, normal 
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 This value of social contribution rate applies when marginal revenue exceeds the value of 512 000 rub (in 2012).  
pension age for the labor pension is 60 years for men and 55 years for women and they must 
have at least 5 years of pension insurance coverage.  
Nonetheless, apart from different types of labor pension (disability labor pension, survivor 
labor pension etc.) there are other types of pensions (social pension, old age pension). That’s 
why all Russian citizens are totally covered by pension payments. Due to number of state, social 
types of pension, a number of pensioners exceed the number of individuals in pension age. In the 
beginning of 2010 there was 30,7 mln individuals (21,6% of total population) aged above 
working age and 39,1 mln pensioners (27,5% of total population). That’s why average age of 
becoming pensioner is lower than officially determined age of retirement. According to 
estimations from Russian Longitudinal Monitory Survey, it is equal to 51,2 for men and 52,3 for 
women. 
Generally the Russia’s pension system implies a high level of population coverage with 
pension insurance. But there are a lot of different characteristics of assessment of pension system 
quality. One of those characteristics is a comparison of pension size with minimum subsistence 
line which allows to estimate an adequacy in providing sufficient level of income.  
In Russia even before 2002 poverty level among pensioners was lower than among whole 
population. However, in 2002 Russian Government decided to bring pension size to minimum 
subsistence line for pensioners and was quite successful in achieving it since that time (see Table 
6).  
Table 6 
Key characteristics of pension system 
 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005
3
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Average pension 
size to minimum 
subsistence level 
76,4 100 102 106,3 97,8 99,8 101,6 115,2 126,6 165,4 
Average pension 
size to average size 
of wage 
31,2 31,6 29,8 28,4 27,6 25,6 22,9 24,3 27,9 35,7 
Source: Russian Federation Federal State statistic service 
Another approach to this assessment is a replacement rate comparison. According to 
International Labor Organization (ILO), the target level of pension size is set at 40% of lost 
earnings. This measure is relevant for a pensioner with 30-year work experience and average 
wage size. But its current applicability is limited by the fact that it was approved in 1952 in 
essentially different socio-economic situation, with minimal female labor force participation, 
when 40% replacement rate was regarded as sufficient for a pensioner with the wife who is also 
in retirement age. We can complement ILO recommendation with the analysis of current 
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 The composition of  consumer basket for pensioner was enlarged 
international practice (see Table 7). In general, it gives us an evidence of significant variation of 
replacement rate in different countries, even in developed countries – OECD members. 
Table 7 
Replacement rates in different countries 
Country Replacement rate Country  Replacement rate 
Australia  47.4/44.7
4
 Japan  34.0 
Austria  67.9 Netherlands  87.0 
Belgium  38.2 Mexico  37.3/35.3
5 
Canada  42.0 Norway  48.3 
Czech Republic  47.5 Spain  73.4 
Denmark  80.4 Sweden  64.3 
France  44.4 Switzerland  49.6/49.0
5 
Germany  39.3 Turkey 68,4 
Greece  81.8 United Kingdom  30.3 
Iceland  100.4 United States  37.5 
Italy  64.7 OECD34  55.3/53.8
5 
 Source: Pensions at a Glance, 2011, p. 141 
According to the Russian Federal State statistic service, replacement rate achieved 35,7% 
for the first time in 2010 (see Table 6). It was a result of costly pension reform aiming at the 
pension size increase. But this achievement is still far away from OECD figures. 
Affordability of Russian pension system, measured by it burden to the federal budget and 
taxpayers who make pension contributions, also leaves much to be desired. In average OECD 
countries spent 2-2,5% of GDP for pension provision (additional to pension contributions), 
which ensures 21-22% of all pension payments (see Table 8).  
Table 8 
Pension system “burden” to the federal budget 
Country Budget Financing of pensions Country Budget Financing of pensions 
Developed 
countries 
Budget 
expenditures 
(% GDP) 
Budget 
expenditures 
(% GDP) 
Developing 
countries 
Budget 
expenditures 
(% GDP) 
Budget 
expenditures 
(% GDP) 
Austria 3,8 30 Bulgaria 3,3 39 
France 0,4 3 Czech 
republic 
0 0 
Germany 3,3 31 Hungary 2,2 21 
Greece 3,2 27 Poland 4,7 41 
Italy 3,6 26 Romania 0 0 
Portugal 1,5 13 Slovakia 2,2 32 
Spain 0 0 Average in 
developed 
countries 
2,4 20,5 
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 For men and women respectively 
Sweden 3,2 34 Average in 
developing 
countries 
2,1 22,1 
Source: Gurvich, p. 16 
 According to the estimation of Economic Expert Group, Russia’s government transfer 
from federal budget to pension payments rose by 3,2% of GDP, from 1,5% in 2007 to 5,2% in 
2010 (see Table 9). Generally, this is a result of costly pension reform 2010 aiming at the 
increase of pension size and replacement ratio.  
Table 9 
Pension system “burden” to the federal budget in Russia 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Transfer from federal budget  1,5 2 3,3 5,2 
Share in public pension provision  24 28 45 60 
 Source: Gurvich, p.8 
 By comparison these figures with figures from Table 8, it’s evident that both the federal 
budget transfer and the share of the government financing in pension provision are higher in 
Russia than across OECD countries.  
At the same time Russian contribution rate is bigger than average in OECD countries (see 
Table 10). Only pension systems of Spain, Italy, Hungary, Chile and Czech Republic involve 
bigger contributions.  
Table 10 
Pension contribution rate (per cent of gross earnings) 
Country Employee 
2009 
 
Employer 
2009 
Total 
Australia  Private pensions contributions only 
Austria  10.3  12.6 22.8 
Belgium  7.5  8.9 16.4 
Canada  5.0 5.0 9.9 
Czech Republic  6.5  21.5 28.0 
Chile 28.8  1.0 29.8  
Denmark  Private pensions contributions only 
France  6.8  9.9 16.7 
Germany  10.0 10.0 20.0 
Greece  6.7  13.3 20.0 
Iceland  No separate pension contribution 
Italy  9.2  23.8 32.7 
Japan  7.7  7.7 15.4 
Netherlands  17.9  0.0 17.9 
Mexico  Private pension contributions only 
Norway  Private pension contributions only 
Spain  4.7  23.6 28.3 
Sweden  7.0  11.9 18.9 
Switzerland  4.9  4.9 9.8 
United Kingdom  No separate pension contribution 
United States  6.2  6.2 12.4 
OECD34  8.4  11.2 19.6 
Russian Federation  0.0 26.0 (22 from 
2012 
26.0 (22 from 
2012 
Source: Pensions at a Glance, 2011, p. 153 
To sum up, Russian pension system, implying bigger part of federal budget financing (as 
a share of GDP) and higher rate of pension contributions, afford lower replacement rate than in 
OECD countries. This state of things clearly indicates pension system inefficiency.  
More than that, long-term sustainability of Russian pension system is further jeopardized 
by the process of ageing of the population (see Table 4). Taking into account politic influence of 
the pensioners, the fact that they constitutes 37% of electorate and this share will expand further 
in the future (see Figure 9) and their high activity during elections, recognition of a drop in the 
value of replacement rate (consequence of population ageing for PAYG-systems) would be 
hardly possible and, on the contrary, they will at least, argue for stable value of replacement rate. 
Figure 9 
Pensioners’ share in electorate 
 
Source: Gurvich, Kudrin, p. 19 
According to Gurvich’s estimations (Gurvich, 2010), to preserve constant value of 
replacement rate and prevent it from gradual reduction, it will be necessary to add 1 percent 
point of GDP to federal budget transfer every 5 years during 2010-2050 or to increase annually 
the rate of pension contributions by 1 p.p. Near the same increase (9,4 p.p. of GDP) in federal 
budget transfer during 40 forthcoming years is predicted by Standard & Poor’s agency for 
Russia.  
Clearly, increase in financing of pension system either by enlargement in federal budget 
transfer or by rise in the rate of pension contributions is unacceptable for economy. In short-run 
these methods will create such problems as reduction in competitiveness of economy due to 
unproductive use of resources and labor supply distortion. In long run this method leads to 
economic crisis. Dealing with problem of population ageing via the rise in the pension 
contributions rate means that the value of rate will attain 70% in 2050! The second possibility, 
rise in budget share of pension financing, implies an increase in share of GDP devoted to pension 
provision by 9 percent point in 40 years. It seems also impossible from economic point of view 
because it can be done only by tax increase or reduction of other budget expenditures. But even 
now we are spending bigger part of budget resources and have bigger rates of pension 
contributions but aren’t capable to achieve the level of replacement rate of developed countries. 
The only way to deal with the problem of population ageing and threat of financial 
sustainability of Russian pension system is increase in retirement age. For example, according to 
Gurvich’s estimations, an increase in the retirement age from values determined by law to 62,5 
for both men and women will allow to increase a number of employees by 9,9% and decrease the 
number of pensioners by 35,9% and obtain the replacement rate that is higher by 171%. 
Furthermore, the Russian Federation has now one of the lowest ages of retirement (55 for 
women and 60 for men) which was established in 1932
 
in USSR as an achievement of socialism 
and has not been revised since then (see Table 11).   
Table 11 
Retirement age in different countries 
Country Retirement age for Life expectancy at 
retirement age 
men women men women 
Australia 65 (67 in 2050) 62 (67 in 2050) 18.6 (19.7) 24.3 (23.3) 
Austria 65 60 (65 in 2050) 17.5 (21.1) 25.1 (24.5) 
Canada 65 65 18.3 (21.4) 21.4 (24.8) 
Czech Republic 61 (65 in 2050) 58.7(65 in 2050) 17 (18.1) 23.8 (22.5) 
Denmark 65 (67 in 2050) 65 (67 in 2050) 16.4 (17.2) 19.8 (21) 
France 60.5 (61 in 2050) 60.5(61 in 2050) 21.7 (24.8) 26.5 (29.5) 
Germany 65 65 17 (20.3) 20.7 (24.4) 
Greece 57 (60 in 2050) 57 (60 in 2050) 24 (24.1) 27.1 (28.3) 
Italy 59 (65 in 2050) 59 (65 in 2050) 22.8 (20.9) 27.4 (25.5) 
Japan 64 (65 in 2050) 62 (65 in 2050) 19.8 (21.6) 26.7 (27.7) 
Mexico 65 65 17.2 (18.9) 19.4 (21.9) 
Netherlands 65 65 17.3 (20.6) 20.4 (23.5) 
Norway 67 67 15.7 (18.9) 18.9 (22.5) 
Portugal 65 65 16.3 (19.2) 20.2 (23.6) 
Spain 65 65 17.9 (21.4) 21.8 (25.1) 
Sweden 65 65 17.9 (21.1) 21.1 (24.2) 
Switzerland 65 63 (64 in 2050) 18.9 (22.4) 24.1 (26.6) 
Turkey  44.9(62.3 in 2050) 41(60.8 in 2050) 31.1 (22.5) 36.9 (23.2) 
United Kingdom 65 (68 in 2050) 60 (68 in 2050) 16.9 (16.9) 24.5 (21.9) 
United States 66 (67 in 2050) 66 (67 in 2050) 16.8 (17.7) 19.3 (21.9) 
Average in 
OECD countries 
62.9 (64.6 in 2050) 61.8(64.4 in2050) 18.5 (20.3) 23.3 (24.6) 
Russia 60 55 14,6
5
 24,2
6 
Source: Pension at a Glance, 2011 
Moreover, if assume that employment starts at 20 years and continues till the retirement age, 
than in OECD countries it is equal to 179% of the duration of retirement for women and 231% 
for men. For Russian women it equals 143% and it is one of the lowest figures across the world. 
Only Greece has lower value, but we know how it affected their budget system and the 
government debt. In order to achieve the average value of OECD countries the retirement age for 
women should be settled at 59 years. Russian men are characterized by opposite situation; index 
is equal 272% for them.  This value is quite high; however, some other countries (Germany, the 
UK, USA, and Poland) have the same values (see Table 11).  
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 Accroding to Expert Economic Group estimations in 2009 
2.3 Evidence of retirement behavior in the Russian Federation  
Apart from evident necessity to increase the retirement age (substantial rise in old-
dependency ratio, which is deteriorated by the existence of the number of privileges for earlier 
retirement that magnify the dependency of pensioners on working population) there is an 
evidence that it is reasonable to do. The scope of pensioners’ employment is quite high in 
Russia, especially in first years after retirement. During the first years after achievement of legal 
retirement age, near 50% of women and 37% of men continue to work (see Table 12).  
Table 12 
The share of pensioners who continues to work in dependence of sex and age 
Age (years) Share of men 
that have job 
Share of women 
that have a job 
Average share  of 
total population 
Less than 55 48,4% 53,1% 50,9% 
55-60 45,2% 47,7% 47,1% 
60-65 36,8% 29,4% 32,2% 
65-70 21,8% 15,5% 17,8% 
70-75 11,4% 7,5% 8,6% 
75-80 4,3% 2,8% 3,2% 
More than 80 1,6% 0% 0,4% 
 Source: estimations on the basis of RLMS 
Primarily, this is a result of absence of any specific pension provision conditions, which 
restricted individuals from continuation of work and receiving the pension at the same time. But 
by allowing this practice, pension loose its main role – a mean of consumption smoothing during 
individual’s lifetime. In Russia pension plays more likely a role of additional revenue after 
achieving legal retirement age than a role of wage replacement.  
 Meanwhile, there are a number of opponents to pension age increase that raise some 
objections. One of the most evident factors that can prevent the longer employment duration is a 
health status. Of course, health conditions are deteriorating with age but there is no significant 
change at the achievement of retirement age (see Figure 10). It worsens from age to age. 
Econometric analysis did not also find any confirmation of threshold age which achievement 
significantly changes individual’s health conditions.  
Figure 10 
 *- 1 – very good, 2 – good, 3 –average, 4 – poor, 5 – very bad 
Source: estimations on the basis of RLMS 
Pension systems in many countries provide an incentive for the elderly to postpone their 
retirement and continue to work till older than retirement age. This incentive is expressed either 
in a reduction of the pension size when person retire earlier (Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, 
Germany etc.), either in a premium to pension size (Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
France, Germany and so on) or simply once-only tax-free lump sum pension bonus scheme 
(Australia) when person retires later than standard pension age, or in both these kinds of 
incentives.  
In the Russian Federation it’s not possible to claim the pension before the normal eligibility. 
However there are a big number of privileges that allows to claim the labor pension or state 
pension earlier. For example, military, civil servants, teachers, citizens and workers from far 
north regions start to receive pension earlier that legal retirement age.  
As for later retirement, it can be deferred but no more than for 5 years. Every year of 
retirement deferral decreases the expected period of pension payment. Since funded and non-
fixed part of insured component of pension is a distribution of the accumulated capital over 
expected payment period, the deferral results in the increase of the size of these parts of pension. 
(in Russia pensions consist of insured and funded components. The insured part is formed at the 
expense of contributions, paid to the person's individual pension account after 1st January 2002, 
and by transformation of the person's pension rights acquired before 2002 into settlement 
pension capital. At the same time the insured part includes basic fixed labor pension, which was 
equal to 2 963 rubles in 1
st
 February 2011. Funded component is a benefit based on the value of 
person’s savings and interest for them).  
However, such scheme doesn’t provide good incentive to retire later because there is no 
difference between these variants as long as we situated during expected payment period. The 
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amount of accumulated capital is the same, the period of it distribution becomes smaller and it’s 
it that forces to change the pension size. But if we take into account the cost of time (tomorrow’s 
money doesn’t equal to today’s money) someone would prefer to have smaller amount of money 
but today especially in a country where inflation is high. And Russia is an example of such 
country. The deferral can be beneficial when person believe that he would live longer than the 
expected payment period because he will receive the bigger amount of pension till his death even 
if the expected payment period ends. But it’s unlikely that somebody knows his future. To hope 
on this opportunity is irrational, because you can die till the next year, the date of start of pension 
payments, without receiving any money. The possibility of pension capital accrual because of 
deferral had been only discussed in the Russian government and will start to function in several 
years.  
Further, the minimum expected period of pension payment was 192 month (16 years) in 
2010. But cause of the pension reform 2002, this expected period has been changing since 
January 2002. It increased by 6 months from 144 (12 years) till 192 months (16 years) and 
increases by 12 month till it achieves 19 years (see Table 13). After that it will be determine by 
federal law on the basis of statistical data about lifetime of pension receivers. 
Table 13 
Expected period of pension payments 
01.2002 144 months (12 years) 
01.2003 150 months 
01.2004 156 months (13 years) 
01.2005 162 months 
01.2006 168 months (14 years) 
01.2007 174 months 
01.2008 180 months (15 years) 
01.2009 186 months 
01.2010 192 months (16 years) 
01.2011 204 months (17 years) 
01.2012 216 months (18 years) 
01.2013 228 months (19 years) 
Source: Federal law “About labor pension in the Russian Federation”, paragraph 32 
So the deferral during this period lost practically all his small benefit and that’s why for 
Russian pensioners there is no real option to retire now or to postpone the retirement by one 
year, it’s always better to retire as soon as possible and to combine work with the pension 
payments as there is no any income test for pensioners.  That’s why we can’t apply the option-
value model of Stock and Wise (1990) in analyzing the retirement behavior of pensioners. But 
still, some individuals prefer to give up a job as soon as they start to receive pension payments 
and the possible influence of retirement age increase can’t significantly affect their life. Thus it is 
worthwhile to analyze the retirement behavior of individuals and to find out which factors are 
related to retirement decision and how they are related. 
 
  
Chapter 3. Empirical analysis 
3.1 Data, methodology and hypothesis. 
The objective of this study is analysis of retirement behavior in Russia. There are a number 
of ways to define retirement and appropriateness of the definition depends in large part on its 
aim. Lazear (1985) distinguished 5 possible objective definitions of retirement: 
1) The individual is out of the labor force with the intention of remaining out permanently 
2) The individual has reduced his hours substantially from some lifetime average and 
intends to maintain hours at or below the current level 
3) The individual receives some of his income as pension benefits 
4) The individual appears on some company’s retirement roll 
5) The individual receives primary social security payments 
Lazear considers that the first definition is most appropriate if one is interested in discussing 
patterns of labor force participation by age, over time or cross-sectionally. The second one is 
useful for the analyses that focus heavily on hours in the labor force. The third is applicable 
when studying the well-being of various groups in the population or when trying to estimate 
pension costs over time or by region. The forth is of interest when the study relates to turnover or 
duration of employment in general. The fifth may be the definition of choice for studies having 
to do with social security, its costs, benefits and cross-subsidies effects.  
The fifth definition is irrelevant for Russia as it doesn’t have social security program that 
would be a separate part of pension payments. Analysis of the retirement behavior in Russia is 
necessary for understanding the factors of retirement and that’s why is relevant for pension 
system financing and pension reform concerning the retirement age increase. That’s why for the 
purpose of this study it would be better to determine the retirement as a process when the 
individual receives pension benefits. Thus, retirement behavior is individual’s behavior is a 
choice between two alternatives: to continue to work further or to leave the job.  
Data 
Data for this analysis are drawn from the Russian longitudinal monitoring survey (RLMS), a 
series of nationally representative surveys of individuals and households in the Russian 
Federation. It has been run jointly by National Research University – Higher School of 
Economics and the Demoscope team with a participation of the Carolina Population Center at 
the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. RLMS had been conducted 19 times since 1992 
and is still only source of information about socio-economic position and health conditions of 
Russian population.  
In the study we used data for 6 subsequent years from 2005 to 2010, data from 15
th
 to 19
th
 
waves of the surveys. To analyze the determinants of retirement decision, individuals who 
worked in 2005-2009 years and started to receive pension benefits in 2006-2010 years were 
selected from the whole base of observations. Moreover, the sample was restricted to individuals 
who are beneficiaries of different types of labor pension apart from beneficiaries of “loss of 
breadwinner” type of labor pension. In order to concentrate on the actual retirement behavior we 
focused only on those individuals who take these retirement decision voluntarily and left apart 
all individuals who have been fired or forced to leave the job because of the tense relations with 
front office or job cut. Thus we know that the observed behavior is a real choice of individuals 
that is not a case for those who can’t continue to work because of different reasons even if they 
want.  
Altogether, these actions resulted in the sample of 558 individuals. The most important 
criterion is the person’s participation in 19th wave of survey. The data from this wave serves as a 
source of information about the beginning date of pension payments and the behavior of a 
particular pensioner after the achievement of retirement age. 
The dependent variable is a decision of the pensioner who just started to receive pension 
benefits. He has 2 options:  
 to continue to work further and thus receive pension payments and wage 
simultaneously 
 to leave his/her job and to remains out of labor force.  
Thus, it is binominal variable which takes a value of 1 if pensioner continues to work 
while starting to receive pension benefits and takes a value of 0 if the person give up a job. 
Variable that allows to indicate the retirement decision of particular pensioner is a period of time 
that the person worked after starting to receive pensions. Null duration we interpret as a decision 
to leave the job and that’s why Y takes the value of 0. And if in a survey a person reported some 
duration of employment after retirement date it was treated as his/her decision to continue to 
work further, thus Y takes a value of 1. However, in some cases, when the duration of work 
period after retirement date don’t exceed several months (from 1 to 3 months) and more than this 
pensioner reported that he/she has not more job on the date of survey we regarded it also as a 
decision to remain out of labor force. We made such decision because, first of all, there a few 
persons like this. They are significantly different from other respondents and between duration of 
1 to 3 months there is some gap to those who decided to work further after retirement. Secondly, 
only some small things don’t allow to a person to leave a job right on the time of retirement. 
Among them we can list that the employer needs some time to find a new employee and can ask 
the retiree to transfer his experience and to teach a new employee. Also, the retiree can 
technically overstay because of sick leave or a vacation. Thirdly, he/she can delay the application 
for pension and because of the pension assignment takes some time it can also resulted in some 
work after retirement day.  
Thus, logit/probit analysis is used to estimate the probability of work continuation after 
the achievement of retirement date and to find out the determinants of such decision. Because of 
the differences in legally set retirement age of women and men and also due to potential 
differences in the reasoning of retirement decision the logit/probit analysis is carried out 
separately for sub-sample of men and women.  
Independent variables.  
The choice of independent variables is related to the review of empirical literature and is 
restricted by information that contains in questionnaires of RLMS. Thus, we dispose with such 
independent variables as: 
 wage size.  
The values of this wage size were taken in a year prior to retirement date. If a person 
reported that he started to receive pension benefits in 2008, than we were looking for the values 
of wage size in 2007, if there is no data in 2007, we checked the data from 2006 and if not – 
from 2005. In order to assure the comparability of wage size in different years, we take the 
relative value of a person’s wage to the average wage in the sample of that year. Thus for each 
individual we have a percentage ratio of his/her wage. 
 As was discussed above, there is no definite prediction about the wage influence on the 
person’s labor supply. It creates simultaneously substitute effect that makes leisure more 
expensive and encourage to work, while income effect incites to work less. Thus, the wage effect 
on the retirement decision is ambiguous. 
 pension size 
The values of pension size were taken in a year when the person retires with a hypothesis 
that exactly this value (obtained in a year of retirement) is the most influential in the person’s 
decision to continue to work further/to retire. If the data were not available in this year we take 
values from subsequent years. The same principal for data comparability underlies this variable. 
We use a percentage ratio of person’s pension size to the average one as a regressor in an 
econometric analysis.  
Here, the direction of impact on the retirement decision is more evident. Pension is 
another source of income and therefore creates only income effect. So, the higher pension size is, 
the more likely the person gives up a job. 
 Self-estimation of health status. 
This variable reflects individual’s assessment of his/her status. It’s assumed that the more 
positive health estimation individual has the more likely he will work further, because it’s self-
sentiment that really matters. This variable takes a value of 1 if individual feels himself/herself 
very good, 2 –good, 3 – when individual feels himself/herself so-so, he/she can’t say if his/her 
health is rather good or rather bad, 4 – when he/she feels bad, 5 – very bad. In order to escape 
problems with endogeneity described by Bazolli, the data were taken from the waves of survey 
prior to retirement. However, some objective measures of health were used too with supposition 
that the worse health condition individual has the more likely his/her decision to give up a job.  
The objective measures used in this study include: 
o The existence of health problems. It reflects the existence of any kind of health 
problems within 30 days prior to survey. It takes value of 1 if person has them 
and 0 otherwise. The data were taken from the waves of survey prior to 
retirement or in case of data absence for these years in a year of retirement.  
o Disability. This variable reflects the fact if person is disabled (then the variable 
takes a value of 1) of not (variable takes a value of 0). Disability significantly 
limits the ability to work and thus it’s assumed that disabled persons gave up 
their work and retire more often. The data for this variable were taken from 
waves of survey prior to retirement and in case of the data absence in those 
years in a year of retirement.  
o Hospital. This variable is an answer to the question if during three last months 
person has spent some of these days in hospital. If the answer is positive than 
the variable takes a value of 1, if the answer is negative – the value of 0. The 
fact that person has spent some days in hospital gives an evidence that he/she 
has some problems with health and that’s why less likely to continue to work 
further. The data for this variable were taken from waves of survey prior to 
retirement and in case of the data absence in those years in a year of retirement.  
o Heart disease. This is dummy variable of existence of heart disease that takes a 
value of 1 if person has it and a value of 0 otherwise. Heart diseases are main 
reason of mortality in Russia therefore they can be fair and objective indicator 
of person’s health status. The data for this variable were taken from waves of 
survey prior to retirement and in case of the data absence in those years in a 
year of retirement.  
o Heart attack (infarct). As heart disease presence can be not evident for 
individual it cannot affect his/her retirement decision, while its development 
can’t remain unnoticed for him/her and that’s why it takes a participation in 
his/her retirement decision. This variable takes a value of 1 if person 
experienced heart attack and a value of 0 otherwise. The data for this variable 
were taken from waves of survey prior to retirement and in case of the data 
absence in those years in a year of retirement.  
 Child existence 
 This variable reflects whether a particular person has children. Its values were taken from 
the answer to corresponding question of survey prior to the retirement date. If such data were not 
available, we seek for them in a year of retirement or in any of subsequent years with an 
assumption that this type of variables can varies only slightly in time. Thus it takes a value of 1 if 
the person has at least one child and the value of 0 if the person has no children at all.  
 It’s supposed that if a person has children, he/she has can count on some financing 
support from them and that’s why give up job earlier. Also a possibility of grandchildren 
existence (that can’t be traced in RLMS questionnaires) can also distract the elderly from labor 
participation in order to care about them. But it’s truer for women. 
 Child number 
This variable of the same character as a previous one but allows to check some 
hypothesis about the choice of retirement because of necessity of caregiving activities to 
grandchildren in detail because the bigger number of children person has the bigger number of 
grandchildren is. Its values were taken with the same idea and the same order as the values of 
previous variables. However, this variable has a value from 0 to 7.  
 Youth existence 
This variable has also the same character as a previous one but allows to concentrate on a 
hypothesis of deferral of the retirement because of necessity to help children that are still 
financially dependent. If the pensioner has minors it can induce him/her to work further in order 
to help their education and formation. However, the idea and the order of receiving the data is 
the same as for the previous two variables. The variable takes a value from 0 to 3.  
 Marital status 
This variable is a marital status of individual that takes a value of 0 if a person is a 
widower or have not been married at all and a value of 1 if a person is married or is situated in 
civil marriage. The data are taken from the survey of the year of retirement or if such data were 
not available from previous or subsequent years. There is no accurate hypothesis concerning the 
behavior of married pensioners. A lot depends on happiness of marriage.  
 Education level 
This variable reflects the highest obtained level of person’s education. It takes a value of 
1 if a person has accomplished only several years of primary schools, a value of 2 in a case of 
unfinished secondary education, a value of 3 when he/she has some additional education to 
his/her unfinished secondary education, a value of 4 – in a case of completed secondary 
education, a value of 5 – in a case of specialized secondary education, a value of 6 – in a case of 
higher education and academic degree. The values of variable were taken from the survey of the 
year prior to the retirement date or of any subsequent or previous years. This variable doesn’t 
vary in a time when individual is about his retirement date. 
 Harmful conditions of the job 
This variable describes the health hazard of individual’s job. Some professions imply 
harmful conditions for the individual’s health because of their nature (for example, iron works, 
miner labor) and that’s why can limit the ability of a person to work and induce hin/her to retire 
earlier. This variable takes value of 0 if a person’s job is not harmful for his/her health and a 
value of 1 if it has health hazard. The data about the character of individual’s job were taken 
from the survey’s information prior to the retirement year.  
 State-owned company 
This variable is another characteristic of person’s job. It’s assumed that a pensioner have 
more chances to work longer in a state-owned company that in private one. It can be related with 
a number of reasons. Firstly, the employment in public sector is not so prestige in Russia, that’s 
why there is always a shortage in young specialists who wants to work there and so, more 
possibilities for pensioners to work longer. Secondly, job in public sector is less stressful and has 
more permissive working hours than in private sector and that’s why can be more appropriate for 
pensioners. Thirdly, typical public entities are schools, hospitals, universities – entities where the 
experience matters a lot. Thus, they can be more interested in the employment of the elderly.  
This variable takes a value of 1 if company is public or the state is co-owner of the 
company. The variable has a value of 0 otherwise. The data were taken from the survey’s 
information prior to the retirement year 
 Ownership of the company 
This variable describes the individual’s possession of the company where he/she works. 
In this study it’s suggested that the ownership of the company induce its holder to work further. 
It can be true because as an owner he/she is interested in the company’s business and that’s why 
tries to work as long as possible in order to control it better and to know everything in more 
detail than it can be achieved without employment. More than that, by continuing to work for 
own company he/she can ensure that he/she sacrifices with maximum efforts and convince 
himself/herself that he did everything he/she can in case of negative outcome. Thirdly as an 
owner of the business he/she can’t be forced to leave the company because he/she is the most 
important person in the company and that’s he/she who makes all major decision. Thus, 
ownership can guarantee the employment in the company even after the retirement. 
This variable takes a value of 1 if particular person is an owner of the company where 
he/she works and the value of 0 otherwise. The data were taken from the surveys prior to 
retirement year. 
 Job satisfaction 
This variable is another job characteristic that can influence significantly the individual’s 
retirement decision. This variable is an answer to the question about the person’s satisfaction 
with his/her job. It’s supposed the more satisfaction that the job brings to a particular person the 
more likely this person decides to continue to work there after the achievement of retirement. 
And on the contrary, the less satisfaction the person has from the job the most likely that he gives 
up it. 
This variable takes a value of 1 if person fully satisfied with his/her job, the value of 2 if 
he/she satisfies. It has a value of 3 if person is indifferent with his/her job, the value of 4 if 
he/she is rather unsatisfied and a value of 5 it he/she totally unsatisfied with his/her job. The data 
were taken from the waves of survey prior to the retirement year.  
 Life satisfaction 
In contrast to the previous variable this one describes person’s attitude to the life itself. 
Job satisfaction constitutes only a part of such assessment and therefore can omit important 
factors that can possibly affect the person decision about work continuation/give up. It’s 
supposed that a person who has more satisfaction with his/her life continues to work further after 
the retirement, while person with unsatisfied attitude to life will probably give up in attempt to 
change something in his/her life in order to change his/her attitude to life. Thus, the 
interpretation of the values taken by this variable is similar to the previous. 1 in case of totally 
satisfaction, 2 – rather satisfaction, 3 – indifferent, 4 – person is rather unsatisfied, 5 – totally 
unsatisfied. The data were also taken from the waves of survey prior to retirement.  
 Financial situation 
This variable emphasizes another side of person’s life, its financial aspect. Giving the 
importance of money and financial well-being in the XXI century, the person’s assessment of 
his/her financial situation can play a significant role in his/her retirement decision. In this study 
we assumed that the more satisfaction a person has with his/her financial conditions the less 
likely he/she will continue to work after the achievement of retirement. This hypothesis can be 
explained by income effect of wealth. There is no need to make efforts to get money because 
person has already them.  
The variable takes value of 1 if person is totally satisfied with his/her financial situation, 
2 if he/she is rather satisfied, 3 – neither, 4 – is rather unsatisfied, 5 – is totally unsatisfied. The 
data for this variable were taken from the waves of survey prior to retirement 
 Age of pension payments start 
This variable is an age of individual when he/she starts to receive pension benefits. As in 
Russia there are a number of privileges that allows earlier retirement, the actual retirement age is 
even smaller than the legally set. Thus, individuals who receives a right on pension payments 
earlier can have even more possibilities to continue work and therefore younger retirement age 
should follow with higher rate of decision to continue to work further. However, the persons who 
hesitated with his/her retirement at his/her legally set age has less chances to continue to work 
because he/she is already older and most probably has worse health.  
The data for this variable were obtained as the difference between the date of the pension 
payments start and the date of birth reported in the surveys. The values range from 25 (for 
military pension) to 80 years. 
 Planned behavior 
This variable stands for the individual planned behavior concerning future retirement. 
In the RLMS surveys there is a question that inquires about individual’s plans concerning a type 
of behavior after the retirement date. More precisely it allows to understand if the individual 
regards the pension size as sufficient level of income for his/her life as a pensioner. For example, 
he/she can count on the continuation of employment and additional income in form of wage in 
order to provide fully his/her needs. If the person imagine his life after the retirement only with 
the income that include wage it means that he/she would rather continue to work further. If prior 
to the retirement the person says that he/she sees his/her retirement as a life with the pension as 
only source of income, than he/she is predisposed to give up the job. It’s assumed that the 
person’s actual retirement decision coincides with his/her planned one. 
This variable takes a value of 1 if person plans to live after the retirement on his/her 
wage together with the pension and a value of 0 otherwise. The data were taken from the surveys 
prior to the retirement year.  
 Crisis 
This variable allows to control the possible effects of the world financial crisis on the 
employment of the elderly. The outcome of the crisis for Russian economy was 7,8% drop of 
GDP in 2009 and the more than 10% decline in industrial production. In conditions of 
employment rise, bigger effect more likely concerned the elderly. They are the first candidates 
who can be fired in the crisis situation. As the retirement decision is not free from the influence 
of the demand side, some of newly become pensioners could decide rather to retire than to search 
for another possible job that in crisis time became more difficult. Moreover, the available 
positions could be not so attractive concerning wage size and job conditions. So in this study it’s 
assumed that in crisis years the percent of those pensioners who decided to give up their job is 
higher because of the crisis influence.  
Therefore, this variable takes a value of 1 for crisis years 2009 or 2010 and the value 
of 0 for other years. 2008 we regard as non-crisis year, because the first event that affected 
Russian financial market was Lehman brother’s bankruptcy that occurred in September. The 
effect of financial market on the real economy was very small and had not yet come out, so we 
judge 2008 as non-crisis year.  
3.2 Econometric results 
The logit results for the probability to continue to work further after the retirement 
date (start of pension payments receiving) are presented in the Table 14. The results are given 
separately for women and men but only for those who started to receive any kind of labor 
pension, except the “breadwinner type” of labor pension. 
Table 14 
Logit analysis of the probability to continue to work after the retirement date 
 men women 
 Coefficient 
estimate 
Standard 
error 
Odds 
ratio 
Coefficient 
estimate 
Standard 
error 
Odds 
ratio 
Intercept 0,204 2,296  30,78*** 6,12  
Disability -6,000*** 1,397 0,002 -4,830*** 1,160 0,008 
Heart disease -1,726** 0,799 0,178    
Age of pension 
payments start 
   -0,511*** 0,106 0,600 
Education level 0,308 0,252 1,360 0,398** 0,181 1,488 
Wage size 0,025*** 0,009 1,026    
Pension size -0,038** 0,015 0,962    
Financial situation 0,526 0,339 1,691    
Crisis    -0,604 0,380 0,547 
State-owned 
company 
1,053* 0,606 2,865    
Marital status    -0,785* 0,407 0,456 
Child’s number 0,231 0,424 1,260 -0,414* 0,239 0,661 
Planned behavior -1,797 0,631 6,029 -1,237*** 0,357 0,290 
Life satisfaction -0,697** 0,323 0,498    
N  126 260 
Preudo-R
2 
0,5124 0,3812 
LR chi2 80,20 103,69 
Prob >chi2 0,0000 0,0000 
*** - p-value<0,01 
** - p-value < 0,05 
*- p-value < 0,1 
 In logistic regression analysis an equivalent statistic to R-squared in OLS does not exist. 
The logit model estimates are maximum likelihood estimates arrived at through an iterative 
process. They are not calculated to minimize variance; however, to evaluate the goodness-of-fit 
of logistic models, several pseudo R-square have been developed. These are "pseudo" R-squares 
because they look like R-squared in the sense that they are on a similar scale, ranging from 0 to 1 
(though some pseudo R-square never achieve 0 or 1) with higher values indicating better model 
fit, but they cannot be interpreted as one would interpret an OLS R-squared.  
Stata produces McFadden's pseudo R-squared. According to the regression output, our 
models are not bad, pseudo R
2
 are quite high (0,512 and 0,381 respectively for men and women), 
especially for men sub-sample. So models have good model fit but we should use another tests 
because of different nature of pseudo-R
2
. The likelihood ratio chi-square of 80.2 and 103,7 
respectively for women and men with a p-value of less than 0.0001 tells us that our model as a 
whole fits significantly better than an empty model (a model with no predictors).  
 The goodness-of-fit measures give also an evidence of quite good estimation results for 
both sub-samples of men and women (see Table 15,16). By comparing fitted and actual values 
this measure reports a quite high predictive power of our estimated logit models, 88,1% for men 
and 85% for women. However, the retirement behavior of men is better predicted than that of 
women. 
Table 15 
Goodness-of-fit measure for men 
 
Table 16 
Goodness-of-fit measure for women 
 
Generally speaking, the logit results for the probability to continue to work further after 
the retirement date are consistent with a priori expectations and previous research (see Table 14). 
                                                  
Correctly classified                        88.10%
                                                  
False - rate for classified -   Pr( D| -)   15.79%
False + rate for classified +   Pr(~D| +)   10.23%
False - rate for true D         Pr( -| D)    7.06%
False + rate for true ~D        Pr( +|~D)   21.95%
                                                  
Negative predictive value       Pr(~D| -)   84.21%
Positive predictive value       Pr( D| +)   89.77%
Specificity                     Pr( -|~D)   78.05%
Sensitivity                     Pr( +| D)   92.94%
                                                  
True D defined as Y != 0
Classified + if predicted Pr(D) >= .5
   Total            85            41           126
                                                  
     -               6            32            38
     +              79             9            88
                                                  
Classified           D            ~D         Total
                       True         
Logistic model for Y
                                                  
Correctly classified                        85.00%
                                                  
False - rate for classified -   Pr( D| -)   24.49%
False + rate for classified +   Pr(~D| +)   12.80%
False - rate for true D         Pr( -| D)    6.12%
False + rate for true ~D        Pr( +|~D)   42.19%
                                                  
Negative predictive value       Pr(~D| -)   75.51%
Positive predictive value       Pr( D| +)   87.20%
Specificity                     Pr( -|~D)   57.81%
Sensitivity                     Pr( +| D)   93.88%
                                                  
True D defined as Y != 0
Classified + if predicted Pr(D) >= .5
   Total           196            64           260
                                                  
     -              12            37            49
     +             184            27           211
                                                  
Classified           D            ~D         Total
                       True         
Logistic model for Y
Nevertheless, obtained results are quite different for men and women. First of all, some factors 
that are important in explanation of women retirement behavior, don’t mean anything in the 
retirement behavior of men. For example, such factors as marital status or crisis that influence on 
the retirement behavior of women explain nothing in men retirement decision. On the contrary, 
such financial variables like the size of wage or pension, person’s feeling about his/her financial 
situation, that matters a lot in the retirement decision of men, have no sense in the explanation of 
women retirement behavior. The same is true for dummy variable of state presence in a 
company. Secondly, some factors that significant for women don’t have significant influence in 
the behavior of men. For instance, education level, number of children and planned retirement 
behavior are significant for women decision while they are not significant for men. Finally, there 
is factor that affects the retirement behavior of men and women in different ways. This is child 
number. It reduces the probability of work continuation after the retirement date for women, 
while increases it for men.  
So women and men take into account different factors while deciding about the 
retirement. Women are more oriented on their social function as a caregiving person. They make 
decision considering their marital status, number of children and taking into account possible 
limitations of their choice like economic (crisis situation) and health  (disability, age) restriction. 
Men are more preoccupied with their role in the family as an earner, who should provide family 
with money, food and so on. That’s why determinants of their behavior are the size of pension, 
the size of wage, the personal judgment about financial situation and life satisfaction that are 
restricted by their ability to work because of health situation (disability, heart diseases). The 
common for men and women determinants that explained their retirement decision are education 
level and planned retirement behavior that can’t be treated neither as an incentive to work 
further, no as limitation to do that. 
The most significant difference between those men who continue to work after the 
retirement and those who give up a job is determined by the presence of state ownership of the 
company. The odds ratio of work continuation in state company is 2,87 times as large as the odds 
of work continuation in non-public company. After that the significant differences between odds 
ratio are observed for level of education, level of satisfaction with financial situation, number of 
children and planned behavior. However, all these variables are not significant in the modeling 
of men retirement decision. Among significant ones this is wage size and pension size that 
matter. 1% increase in relative size of wage lead to 1,03 times higher odds ratio for the 
probability of work continuation, while 1% increase in relative size of pension resulted in the 
reduction of odd ratio and thus in the increase of the probability to give a job after the retirement. 
As for women, the most significant difference is determined by the level of education. 1 
step in education level results in 1,49 times higher odds ratio. So the proportion of those woman 
who continue to work after the retirement to those woman who give up a job increases by 1,5 
with 1-step rise in education level. Others factors diminish such proportion and thus the 
probability to continue to work after the retirement. The bigger the number of children woman 
has, the older she is when she starts to receive pension payments or the existence of husband the 
lower the probability to continue to work is. The factor of having a job in state or not company is 
not significant for women.  
For better understanding of role of different factors in men and women retirement 
decision, their importance and their significance, let’s consider two examples. We estimate the 
marginal effects of influence of different factors on the retirement decision for a particular 
person. Firstly we are considering men retirement decision.  
For man without heart disease and disability problems satisfied with his financial 
conditions and his life who obtained average wage size and receives average pension size who 
has 2 children and completed secondary education who had a job in a non-state company and 
planned to live during retirement period only with pension payments, the probability to continue 
to work further is 47,5%. This probability increases with increase in relative size of wage, 
number of children and education level. 1% increase in relative size of wage increases the 
probability of work by 0,6%. If men has one more baby, the probability to work further increases 
by 5,75%. Additional level of education increases the probability by 7,67%. However, relative 
pension size increase and rise in satisfaction with life decrease the probability to work after the 
retirement date even further (see Table 17). 1% decrease in relative size of pension reduces the 
probability of work by 0,95%, while 1-level increase in life satisfaction – by 17,4%!  
Table 17 
Marginal effects in logit estimation for men 
                                                                               
life_s~n    -.1738792       .0805   -2.16   0.031  -.331657 -.016101         2
financ~n      .131045      .08456    1.55   0.121  -.034686  .296776         2
planDE~R*    .3701715      .14856    2.49   0.013   .079001  .661342         0
state_~r*    .2466576      .14002    1.76   0.078   -.02777  .521086         0
educ_l~l     .0767194      .06272    1.22   0.221  -.046202  .199641         4
pensio~E    -.0095387      .00377   -2.53   0.011  -.016919 -.002159       100
ch_num~r     .0575475      .10595    0.54   0.587  -.150115   .26521         2
wageSIZE     .0063562       .0024    2.64   0.008   .001643  .011069       100
disabi~y*   -.4725314      .18253   -2.59   0.010  -.830279 -.114784         0
heart_~e*   -.3361526      .13948   -2.41   0.016  -.609521 -.062784         0
                                                                              
variable        dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X
                                                                              
         =  .47478088
      y  = Pr(Y) (predict)
Marginal effects after logit
 For woman that is married and has 2 children, had finished secondary education, that is 
no disable person and started to receive her pension payments at age of 55 in the non-crisis year 
and has already planned to live during pension period with only a pension, the probability to 
continue to work is 55,1%. This probability increases by 10,1% with the level of education and 
by 26,8% if she has already planned to work after the retirement date. Unmarried women with 
fewer children have bigger probability to continue to work further, the probability to work for 
them is 80,6%. However, woman who started to receive their pension benefits at older age or in 
crisis year have smaller probability to continue to work. The probability to give up a job for them 
increases by 12% per year of later start of pension benefits receiving and by 11,7% if the 
retirement occurred in crisis year (see Table 18). Disability reduces significantly the probability 
to continue to work further for woman in reference case, the probability decreases by 54%! 
Table 18 
Marginal effects in logit estimation for women 
 
So government by manipulating with financial incentives and providing possibilities of 
employment in public sector can affect the men retirement decision to mitigate the effect of 
global ageing. For example, encouraging the later retirement by financial variables, providing 
possibilities of public employment and ensuring good medicine levels to reduce health 
limitations, government can increase the employment of men after the retirement date and thus 
diminish the problem of labor force shortage, and pension contributions lack. However the 
different factors are important for influence on women retirement decision. On some of them is 
very difficult to affect by government policy or this government policy would not correspond 
with other aims of the government or simply code of conduct. It happens because the factors that 
increase the probability to continue to work is reduction in the number of children, the earlier 
provision with pension payments or fact to not to be in marriage. Thus, the influence of the 
government policy is restricted by good medical service provision, crisis situation prevention and 
promotion of women education. However, these results are obtained on the observed behavior of 
war generation, when possibilities and society code don’t significantly involve women in 
education. This situation has considerably changed since those times and so, this propaganda’s 
opportunities are already limited. Nonetheless, some propaganda of the necessity to continue to 
                                                                              
planDE~R*    .2675589       .0781    3.43   0.001   .114476  .420642         0
ch_num~r    -.0987934      .05924   -1.67   0.095  -.214905  .017318         2
mar_st~s*    -.157007       .0914   -1.72   0.086  -.336139  .022125         1
  crisis*   -.1167437      .09532   -1.22   0.221  -.303563  .070075         0
educ_l~l     .1012576      .04628    2.19   0.029   .010555  .191961         4
vozrPO~s    -.1201306      .02522   -4.76   0.000  -.169562 -.070699        55
disabi~y*   -.5405715      .08685   -6.22   0.000  -.710788 -.370355         0
                                                                              
variable        dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X
                                                                              
         =  .55074354
      y  = Pr(Y) (predict)
Marginal effects after logit
work after the legally set retirement date can also have some affect since it’s affect women 
planned behavior and so their retirement decision. Also government should be aware that its 
policy in other areas could affect the retirement decision in a way that is not beneficial for 
country. For example, mitigation the consequences of demographic crisis lead to the 
development of the public policy of stimulating additional birth in each family in Russia. This 
policy is supported with significant amount of money for the birth of second and third child and 
that’s why has substantial impact on the women behavior. But this policy negatively affects the 
retirement decision of women (encourage them to give up a job) while encourages men to work 
further after the retirement and increasing the proportion of youth population. So the retirement 
policy is quite difficult and the government should take into account different factors from 
different sides of life that can affect the retirement decision of men and women. And more than 
that, there are others types of public policy and their development should take into account their 
possible influence on others aspect of individual’s life and thus on other types of public policy.  
  
Conclusion 
 This paper presents the result of econometric estimation concerning the probability to 
continue to work further after the start of pension payments receiving for men and women in 
Russia. The method of estimation is logit procedure estimation that was implemented for ex-post 
analysis of the observed retirement behavior of Russian pensioners using a work-leisure model. 
The data concern a period of time from 2005 to 2010. Actual retirement decisions have been 
treated as dependent variable and various social, economic and personal characteristics have 
been regarded as possible determinants of the retirement decision. 
Econometric analysis showed that the determinants of the retirement decision are quite 
different for men and women. In other words they take into account different factors while 
deciding about the retirement. Women are more oriented on their social function as a caregiving 
person. They make decision considering their marital status, number of children and taking into 
account possible limitations of their choice like economic (crisis situation) and health  
(disability, age) restriction. Men are more preoccupied with their role in the family as an earner, 
who should provide family with money, food and so on. That’s why determinants of their 
behavior are the size of pension, the size of wage, the personal judgment about financial situation 
and life satisfaction that are restricted by their ability to work because of health situation 
(disability, heart diseases). So factors that matters in explanation of women retirement behavior, 
don’t mean anything in the retirement behavior of men and vice versa.  
Other factors affect the retirement behavior of men and women in different ways. For 
example, the variable number of children reduces the probability of work continuation after the 
retirement date for women, while increases it for men.  
The common for men and women determinants that explained their retirement decision 
are education level and planned retirement behavior that are rather control variable and can’t be 
interpreted neither as an incentive to work further, no as limitation to do that. 
So government by manipulating with financial incentives and providing possibilities of 
employment in public sector can affect the men retirement decision to mitigate the effect of 
global ageing. To change the retirement behavior of women is more complicated because the 
factors that increase the probability to continue to work further for women (reduction in the 
number of children, the earlier provision with pension payments or fact to not to be in marriage) 
can’t be regarded as a desirable outcome of public policy. Thus, the influence of the government 
policy is restricted by good medical service provision, crisis situation prevention and support of 
women education. Meanwhile, medical service provision is quite essential for men retirement 
decision too. Health is regarded as an important limitation for labor activities and that’s why 
weakening the impact of limitation created more possibilities for work continuation.  
So this analysis gives first indications for pension reform realization in a way that is more 
favorable for individuals. It allows for politicians to elaborate appropriate public policy that will 
accompany pension reform and allow to mitigate the negative impact. This policy should be 
concerned with the increase in quality of medical service provision, prevention of crisis situation, 
encouragement of wage size increase and creation of more positions in state companies and 
entities. However some possible direction of public policy development should take into account 
different effect that it can exercise on the retirement behavior of men and women. Meanwhile 
this analysis was performed on the basis of simple work-leisure model and can’t be regarded as 
ultimate truth. Some factors that are more complex concerning the availability of the data as well 
as computational problems could be not taken into account and thus the obtained results should 
be interpreted and used with caution. However, the more profound and detail analysis of the 
retirement behavior of men and women in the Russian Federation is still desired. 
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